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TMANSLAUGHTER ADULTERY AS PROVOCATION
The sight of adultery as sufficient provocation to reduce an
off ense which would otherwise be murder to .manslaughter is a
precept which the law has long recogized.' Although the exact
womb from which it sprang is a matter of speculation, the theory
behind its inception is readily apparent. The reason for miti-
gating a homicide on the basis of provocation is that man's
nature is such when sufficiently aroused b heat of passion, that
his mind is deaf to the voice of reason. 2 The sight of adultery
upon the part of one's spouse, is such an act as will arouse great
passion, therefore the common law judges in their wisdom recog-
nized that the passion aroused was sulfficient to reduce an in-
tentional homicide to manslaughter. Historically there were two
requirements which had to accompany the killing. They were
(1) there had to be ocular inspection of the act,3 and (2) the
mortal blow must have been struck in the first transport of
passion.
4
Portions of the historical view are still with us. In order
to determine what additions or subtractions have been made, the
general precepts laid down above will be examined individually
First, let us examine the use of the word adultery It is per-
haps best defined as illegal sexual intercourse between two per-
sons, at least one of whom is married. The use of the word is one
of limitation as it restricts the invocation of the doctrine of
provocation to the spouse 5 of the party caught in the act. The
'HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 486 (1778).
1 RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 513-514
(3d ed. 1843)
'Pearson's Case, 2 Lewin 216, 168 Eng. Rep. 1133 (1835).
FOSTER, CROWN LAW 296 (2d ed. 1791)
In Daniels v. State, 162 Ga. 366, 133 S.E. 866 (1926) it was held
that the same standard of conduct is required of a wife as is re-
quired of a husband where a slaying growing out of the sight of
adultery is concerned. As this is the only case found where the wife
was the slayer, there is a necessary implication that a single standard
would be applied in all cases of an adulterous killing. There is room
for doubt, however, due to the double standard applied in certain
similar cases. For example, in Kentucky a husband can obtain a
divorce by proof of either adultery or lewd lascivious conduct on the
part of his wife; [Ky. R.S. (1946) 403.020 (4) (c)]; while the wife
must prove that the husband has lived openly and notoriously with
another woman. [Booth v Booth, 12 Ky L. Rep. 988 (1891)]. It
seems only just, however, that in criminal actions, a single standard
should be applied.
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word is perhaps too confining for there are other situations
which are sinilar in nature to the sight of adultery and wich
arouse such passion that they might justify an extension of the
rule. For example, a father catches a person in an unnatural
sex act with his son0 or daughter or a brother finds his sister in
the act of fornication.7 The passion aroused by such a sight
would certainly be great. As the passion is equal to that aroused
by the sight of adultery, the law should place each in the same
class. Therefore, if the sight of adultery is sufficient provoca-
tion, the sight of acts such as these certainly should be sufficient
to reduce a killinig which would otherwise be murder to man-
slaugiter. The step which logically follows is the abandonment
of the term adultery and the substitution for it of the phrase
"the sight of illicit intercourse being practiced by or upon a
spouse or a female relative of close kin or unnatural acts being
practiced by or upon one of close kin." The term close kin
would be limited to wife, husband, sister, brother and child.
As was noted above, the first qualification placed upon the
rule was that the ldller had to have "ocular inspection" of the
act. Although the exact connotation to be placed upon this
phrase is not certain, it strongly implies that the defendant
must have actually seen the parties engaging in the act. This
does not appear to be a reasonable qualification and it is the
opinion of this writer that such is not the rule today In the case
of (ox v State,s the defendant knocked on the door of the de-
ceased's house. lie heard the bed springs screeching and upon
being admitted to the room found the deceased in his under-
clothes and his wife hiding in the next room. Under the "ocular
inspection" rule he would have been convicted of murder for
killing the deceased because he had not actually seen the parties
m the act although there was no doubt in his mind that they had
just been engaging in intercourse. Great heat of passion was
quite naturally aroused in the defendant and he killed the man.
See Regina v Fisher, 8 Car. and P 182, 173 Eng. Rep. 452
(1837).
See Teague v. State, 67 Tex. Crim. Rep. 41, - 148 S.W 1063,
1064-1065 (1912)
100 Tex. Crim. Rep. 402, 273 S.W 580 (1925) The unusual in-
struction indicating that the offense might have been justifiable is
based on TEXAS PENAL CODE, art. 1220 (Vernon 1936) which makes
justifiable the killing by a husband who catches the parties in the
act of adultery.
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It seems illogical to conclude that the defendant should be guilty
of murder in such a case simply because there was a door be-
tween him and the act, in spite of the fact that reasonable men
could draw but one inference from the circumstances. The
fallaciousness of such a conclusion is readily apparent and it is
believed that the requirement of "ocular inspection" defeats-
the purpose of the rule, that is, to mitigate on the grounds of
heat of passion. Therefore, it is submitted that the only logical
test, provided the other requirements are met, is that the de-
fendant find the parties under such circumstances as would
lead to no other conclusion than that the parties had just en-
gaged, or were preparing to engage, in the act.9
The final common law requirement that the mortal blow
must be struck in the first transport of passion is still alive
today Although this phrase as such is not often used, the courts
hold that the killing must be immediate and before the heat of
passion has subsided.1o The word "immediate" adds very little
to the phrase "in the first transport of passion" and it is be-
lieved that neither term is clear. It is therefore suggested that.
whenever the word "immediate" is given in an instruction to a
jury, it should be pointed out that the heat of passion in an
ordinary man, as the law visualizes such a person, cools rela-
tively quickly, and therefore, it is up to the jury to distiguish
between the word "immediately" and the word "presentlv'"
in arriving at whether or not the passion of the particular de-
fendant should have cooled. The test then would be if the de-
fendant killed immediately, the killing could well be man-
slaughter. If, however, it occurred presently, or if the defend-
alit's passion had actually cooled, it would be murder as the
ingredient of malice would be added to the intentional killing.
This distinction will certainly not solve the problem but it is be-
lieved that this will aid the jury in determining whether or not
the defendant's act was done under the smart of heat of
passion.
As heat of passion denotes an emotional state of a man's
mind and provocation refers to those acts which arouse the mind
to such a state, it is readily discernible that the sight of every
adultery will not be sufficient to reduce the offense. There are
See State v Pratt, 1 Houst. Cr. Cas. 249, 265-266 (Del. 1867).
Excellent instruction on reasonable circumstances.
'See Crowder v State, 208 Ala. 697, - 93 So. 338, 340 (1922)
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at least two types of cases where such a sight will not mitigate.
They are (1) where the defendant has consented to the act,1 '
and (2) where the defendant has a preconceived plan to entrap
the parties in the act combined with an intent to kill.1 2 In these
instances, the element of suddenness is eliminated and the de-
fendant has had time to coolly calculate the heinousness of the
offense. Any killing that may occur under the above conditions
savors of revenge and hence is malicious. For this reason such a
killing is deemed murder. It should be added that mere sus-
picion 13 or even the wife's admission 14 of past acts, even though
the mental anguish may be great,' 5 is not sufficient, since this
would violate the cardinal principle that words alone are not
deemed legal provocation. 16
In defending one charged with the killing of another caught
in the act of adultery, the skillful practitioner has available one
of four alternatives in preparing his case. First, he can have
his client plead guilty and throw himself upon the mercy -of the
court. In practically every case this ends in a quick trip to the
death house unless there happens to be a statute making the
offense justifiable.' 7 The second alternative is that of self de-
fense. This type of defense is common in the entrapment cases.
The typical situation is where the defendant catches the parties
in the act, as he knew he would, and then contends that the de-
ceased attacked him and that he killed only to protect his life.is
This defense is relatively weak for the defendant had too obvious
a motive to kill for the jury to place much credence in aiv story
that he may tell. M\1oreover, in such cases it is hard to overcome
the natural presumption that the defendant was the aggressor.
However, it is used in quite a number of cases because an ac-
"See State v. Holme, 54 Mo. 153, 165 (1873)
"-People v Gingell, 211 Cal. 532, 296 Pac. 70 (1931) State v
Agnesi, 92 N.J.L. (7 Gummere) 53, 104 Atl. 299 (1918) State v
Imundi, 45 R.I. 318, 121 Atl. 215 (1923).
" State v. John, 30 N.C. (8 Ire. Law) 330 (1848)
-Humphreys v. State, 175 Ga. 705, 165 S.E. 733 (1932) State
v. Herring, 118 S.C. 386, 110 S.E. 668 (1922)
1Howell v Commonwealth, 218 Ky 734, 292 S.W 329 (1927)
"Richardson v. State, 123 Miss. 232, 85 So. 186 (1920) State v
Benson, 183 N.C. 795, 111 S.E. 869 (1922)
, 6 GEORGIA CODE sec. 75 (Park 1914) see annotations for cases;
5 UTAH CODE, tit. 103 sec. 28-10 (1943) see annotations for cases;
TEXAS PENAL CODE, art. 1220 (Vernon 1936)




quittal will follow in the event the jury does believe the story
The third alternative is based on the technical definition of
provocation. The case is built around the premise that the de-
fendant caught the parties in the act and was so blinded by his
passion that he became deaf to the voice of reason. 19 This de-
fense is very effective as the average juror has a natural aver-
sion for the despoiler of the home and a great sympathy for the
wronged spouse. Although this line of defense will usually save
the defendant from capital punishment, it is used as a last resort
due to the fact that in most states it only mitigates the offense
to manslaughter. The fourth alternative is definitely the most
picturesque. The defense here is based on temporary insanity '11
The defendant testifies that he remembers seeing the parties in
the act, everything went blank and the next thing he remembers
is waking up several hours later in jail. This defense, often re-
ferred to as the "unwritten law," is not too effective for the
modern juror is too realistic to believe that a man goes insane
for an hour or so during his whole lifetime and that the insanity
occurs at the only time it could possibly have been of any ad-
vantage to him.
As the existence of provocation in the law of homicide has
not shown a tendency to fade, the sight of adultery remains as
sufficient provocation to reduce an intentional killing to man-
slaughter. As such, it is a strongly entrenched form of defense.
It must be admitted that such a sight does ordinarily create
great passion due to the deep possessiveness that man feels for
his mate. As it does create such a great passion, the killing that
follows could not be said to be malicious. Therefore, it is logi-
calh- classified as a provoked homincide.
Unquestionably, however, such a sight should not be held to
3ustify the offense, as it is m a number of states.2 ' Also, it is
believed that there should be a strong movement to eliminate
such defenses as the "unwritten law" and that the offense
should be placed on a realistic plane. The reason the law should
be more exacting in such cases is that home ties are not as close
today as they were when the doctrine was conceived. This is
" State v Lee, 6 W W Harr. 11, 171 Atl. 195 (Del. Ct. Oyer and
Ter. 1933)
'See Commonwealth v. Whitler, 2 Brewst. 388, 393 (Pa. 1868),
State v Pratt, 1 Houst. Cr. Cas. 249, 269 (Del. 1867)
" See note 17 supra.
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conclusively proved by the extreme advance in divorce rates in
recent years. It logically follows that as the marriage bonds
grow increasingly loose, the sight of adultery will become more
frequent and hence while the passion aroused by such a sight
will in a majority of cases be sufficient to mitigate the offense,
extriisic facts should be carefully weighed to determine whether
the passion of the particular defendant was actually aroused.
This will eliminate the blind application of the rule to every
case. but will allow it in those cases where the defendant was
actually overcome by his heat of passion.
It is believed that all that is required today, realistically
speaking, is for a husband or wife to catch the parties in the act
of adultery or to catch them in such circumstances as would
lead a reasonable man to believe that the parties had just en-
gaged. or were preparing to engage, in the act and to kill im-
mediately provided there has been no consent or preconceived
plan to entrap with the intent to kill. Liberal construction has
resulted m too loose an application of the rule. While the rule
remains fundamentally sound, it should be cautiously and con-
servatively applied in order that its purpose may be achieved
under modern, changing social conditions.
It is further submitted that the word "adultery" is pei-haps
too confining as the sight of unnatural sex acts being committed
upon a son or daughter or fornication upon a daughter or sister
arouse a passion which is on a par with that of the sight of
adultery Within the limits as defined above and with this last
extension, it is believed that the leniency of the law in the cases
under discussion should give way to the increased need for
severe punishment of persons committing homicide. Too many
other legal remedies2 2 are available to the wronged party to con-
tinLe to perpetuate a loose application of a doctrine which does
not strenuously discourage the taking of a human life. It should
be borne in mind that one cannot make one's spouse virtuous by
killing, and when the flame of life is once snuffed out, nothing
but eternity can restore it.
HAiRRY B. MILLER, JR.
- Divorce, alienation of affection and prosecution for adultery,
to name a few
